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The Museum of Failed Bridges: $7.5B of admission already paid

Room I · Acquired February 2014

Mt. Gox

The founding acquisition

In February 2014 the exchange that had handled over seventy percent of all Bitcoin transactions filed for bankruptcy and reported 850,000 BTC missing, roughly $470 million at the time. Nothing was exploited: the coins were pooled in one place, and every room that follows is a variation on it.

The coins were in someone else’s custody, and then they were not

The Machine

Four calls, and the fourth is the exploit

An address takes everyone’s money, m of n signers say it arrived, and a claim is minted against their word. The fourth line is the same contract, still working, for whoever can satisfy line two.

bridge-architecture.trace tracing…
1 pool.deposit(funds) one address holds everyone’s
2 attest(transfer) ·
3 mint(wrapped) ·
4 drain(pool) ·
documented losses ·

The trace every room in this museum shares

Room II · August 2021

Poly Network

The instrument that obeyed someone new

The bridge could be told to obey someone new

One instruction replaced the keeper, and $611 million followed the new one out. Most of it came back, by discretion, not by design.

Room III · February 2022

Wormhole

Unbacked tokens, minted to order

bridge · complete_transfer verifying…
$ complete_transfer(vaa)
deposit on source none
verify_signatures ·
vaa.verified ·
mint(wrapped) ·
backed by ·

The verifier was bypassed, and the mint believed it

A bug let the attacker skip guardian verification and mint $320 million against a deposit that never happened.

The Admin Path · Room II, in close-up

Told, not broken

A bridge with an owner does not have to be broken; it has to be told. The same search and the same stolen key, run against a bridge and against the escrow a Maxy order sits in.

bridge.sol · onlyOwner searching…
$ grep -n onlyOwner bridge.sol
84: ·
131: ·
167: ·
→ callable by ·
→ moves ·

A bridge with an owner

Three functions answer to one address, and any one of them moves every deposit.

Admin path
Same key
1,000,000USDC

12,400 wallets · key valid

  1. Admin key 0x3f…a91 exported from a holder device
    Exporting…
  2. emergencyWithdraw caller: attacker · admin key: valid
  3. User balances swept in one transaction, no delay

No door for a stolen key to open

Four fixed exits, each signed by the user who owns the balance.

escrow.sol · abi searching…
$ abi.lookup escrow.sol
owner() ·
pause() ·
upgradeTo() ·
→ releases on ·
→ refunds on ·

A contract that does not

The same search against a Maxy order’s escrow: no owner, no pause, no upgrade path.

Curator’s note

“It is our opinion that the incident ledger is not a catalogue of bad luck but a catalogue of architectural choices.”

The Incident Ledger · Maxy Research

Rooms IV–VI

Keys, thresholds, and a proof that said yes

Three rooms, one wall

Room IV · 23 March 2022

Ronin Bridge

Two transactions, six quiet days

Nine keys, four in one building

Four keys sat with one company and a fifth was on loan, never revoked. Nobody noticed for six days.

Room V · 23 June 2022

Harmony Horizon

A short mechanism, briefly described

horizon · multisig.exec signing…
$ multisig.threshold()·
signer 1 ·
signer 2 ·
signers 3–5 ·
execute × 14 ·

The threshold was two

Two of five signatures moved everything. The plaque is brief because the mechanism was.

Room VI · 1 August 2022

Nomad

A collaborative work

Every message was already proven

An upgrade set the trusted root to 0x00, so anyone could copy a withdrawal and swap in their address.

Room VII · Acquired July 2023

Multichain

The custodian was a person

Every MPC node ran under the chief executive’s personal cloud account, and on 21 May 2023 he was arrested in Kunming. In early July more than $125 million left the bridges, and roughly $1.5 billion stayed frozen behind keys held, in effect, by an evidence room.

MPC nodes
Reconstruction Frozen
$1,500,000,000
  1. Custodian arrested · Kunming 21 May 2023 · his devices and phrases went with him
  2. $125M+ withdrawn Early July · never publicly attributed

Multi-party computation, on one man’s cloud account

Room VIII · Acquired 21 February 2025

Bybit

The largest theft in the industry’s history

The attacker never touched the multisig. JavaScript placed on the wallet vendor’s site showed employees the routine transfer they intended and submitted the one the attacker intended, no stolen key required.

The signatures were genuine. The screen was not.

tx.calldata · decode decoding…
$ decode tx.calldata
rendered transfer → warm wallet
signed ·
signatures ·
result ·

Decode what was signed

Three genuine signatures on a call the approval screen never rendered.

The Pattern Room

Different logos, same architecture.

Eight rooms, five families, one instrument

Custody, stolen keys, believed lies, admin paths, poisoned tools: each a different door into the room where the money is pooled and somebody has to be trusted to guard it. The losses are as documented, at the conservative end where published figures disagree.

Eight rooms, filed by the door the money left through

The Maxy Wing · Permanent Collection

Nothing to Steal.

Acquired: never. On display in perpetuity.

This plaque does not claim that nothing can go wrong. It lists what does not exist: every exhibit in the eight rooms behind you is something Maxy declined to build.

  • 01 No pool to drain
  • 02 No admin path to your funds
  • 03 No bridge, no wrapper
escrow.balances reading…
1 escrow #4821 0.6400 BTC
2 escrow #4822 ·
3 pool.balance() ·
4 blast radius ·

Query the pool and there is nothing to answer

Two live orders, two balances, and no pool for a third call to sum.

Verification · Artist: Mathematics

Checked against Bitcoin itself

Not a committee’s opinion

The BTC stays on mainnet at its owner’s address and only proofs move. There is no attestation to forge, because no attestation is read.

Chain Running
965,150
0000…98f1ae
Resolving fork…
Block interval 9.6 min avg
Work Waiting
· header 965,151 received
> sha256d(header)
0000000000000000000 3a9f…
> leading zeros ≥ 19 ✓
> hash ≤ target ✓
work accepted

Four checks, and none of them asks a person

Heaviest chain, proof-of-work, a Merkle proof with the outputs the order names, and confirmation depth.

settle.check · #4821 checking…
settle(#4821)
verify(merkle) ok
outputs == record ·
finality >= 6 ·
solver commits ·
signature → broadcast ·
state → ·

What settle() prints

Every check prints before the state changes. Gas: paid by the solver. Fee: in the spread.

The Escrow

One escrow, and it belongs to one order

The room the eight behind you were built out of is simply not here

Each trade is escrowed per order, one order at a time. If the Bitcoin never lands, the timeout returns the funds to the depositor.

escrow · order #4821
27,300USDC
Depositing
Release
when 0.42 BTC is proven at the order’s address
to 0x3dE7…88C1
Refund
if block 965,160 passes without it
back to the depositor
one order · no pool · no other exit

Released when the Bitcoin lands, refunded if it never does

Colophon

Where the figures come from

Figures in this museum are taken from Maxy Research publications: The Incident Ledger, A Security History of Bitcoin Bridge Exploits (twenty-six incidents, $7.5 billion in cumulative losses since 2020) and the Maxy case files on Ronin, Multichain, Bybit, and the bridge pattern. Every exhibit cites a public post-mortem; no anonymous claims were admitted. Where published figures disagree, the museum reports the conservative end of the range. The screens and terminals in each room are reconstructions drawn from those post-mortems, not captures of any product. Dollar values are as documented at the time of each incident; the running total counts direct documented losses, with Multichain counted at its withdrawn amount rather than its frozen balance.

Built by Maxy Research · The clock, as always, is running.